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rising GDP per capita as well as receipt and, importantly for the purposes of this article, export of foreign direct investment ('FDI') . Recent data on the flows of outward FDI from emerging market states reflects the appearance and rise of the emerging market multinational enterprises ('MNE')s on the world stage that had once been dominated by American, Japanese and European companies.
FDI from developing countries accounted for approximately one quarter of global FDI outflows in 2010 but has been the focus of limited legal academic commentary, primarily from the fields of business and international relations. 1 In that sense it could be stated that the ascendency of emerging market MNEs has occurred to some extent unobserved by the West, which appears to remain pre-occupied with exporting FDI to the emerging states in order to take advantage of their burgeoning middle class. Yet outward FDI from the non-Western world is accelerating relatively more rapidly, and was also more quick to rebound from the global financial crisis of 2008-10 than that of FDI from developed countries. 2 FDI from emerging economies is rising at a relatively faster rate and may ultimately equal or exceed that of Western firms. MNEs from the emerging markets are globalizing at a faster pace than their developed world counterparts, at an earlier stage of their existence, and there are no indications that this will abate in the near future. 3 The Boston Consulting Group claims that fifty of the firms listed in its annual compilation of "Global Challengers", meaning firms from rapidly emerging economies, will qualify for inclusion on Fortune's highly regarded list of the 500 largest companies in the world. both the large quantity of capital held by emerging market MNEs, often backed directly by their home country governments, as well as the dynamic nature of these firms that appear less troubled by the risks that Western firms have associated with internationalization, such as political unrest and legal instability in host states. While
Western MNEs will continue to invest abroad in Asia and Latin America, as well as in
Europe and other developed regions, this will occur alongside and in everintensifying competition with MNEs from the emerging markets. Whereas 20th
Century globalisation was associated with the establishment by Western firms of international markets for their goods and the acquisition of raw materials or low cost manufactured products overseas, these new shifts in capital movement represent what could be described as the defining characteristic of 21st Century globalisation. The description of this new paradigm of international commercial activity as a kind of reverse economic neo-colonialism is compelling: emerging markets may ultimately influence western society including not just economic impacts but possibly also cultural ones. 5 As with the economic expansion of the 20 th Century, there is a danger that vulnerable groups will suffer from this process.
It is not difficult to suppose that many Western countries, now more aware of environmental and social harms that can occur as a consequence of unrestrained growth, will be hostile to this shift. These countries may consequently attempt to arrest this process through the same systems of international investment law that had once underpinned their expansionary interests. This is ironic because the success of emerging market investors has occurred largely because of principles of international investment law developed to serve Western investors during the Pax Americana. The international legal framework governing international investment is undergoing a process of adaptation to this new global order in which capital flows both ways. Whereas IIAs had once been predominately pro-investor, these instruments are now tend to take a more balanced approach to the delineation of the rights and obligations of investors and host governments. Importantly, they also include provision for public policy goals to protect the interests of vulnerable groups.
This more restrained approach of international investment law, seen by some as a departure from the dominant Washington Consensus model of governance rooted in free markets 8 , is not necessarily differentially disadvantageous to foreign over local investors. Many of the changes in international investment law that will be discussed below affect domestic firms equally because they facilitate domestic legislation applicable to all firms regardless of origin. In this way, the observed pull-back in 7 An associated decline of the West generally has been observed and linked to developments like the sovereign debt crisis as well as falling birth rates in Europe. investor's decision where to invest is uncertain, however it can be expected that jurisdictions for which this option is unavailable will appear less attractive.
III) LACK OF AVAILABILITY OF POLITICAL RISK INSURANCE
A second significant barrier to the success of FDI from emerging markets, at least in relation to that directed at the developing world, is the lack of availability of political risk insurance ('PRI'). This problem will be felt more acutely by MNEs from emerging markets than by their western counterparts because of the greater familiarity that developed country firms have with these processes. PRI products have been International oversight of such treaty provisions is unlikely given the sensitive nature of these decisions. As such national security based exceptions stand to remain a highly contentious and common feature of international investment law in the coming decades.
Lastly, although it is not strictly speaking a public policy exception, many Few western-conceived IIAs use definitions of investor that explicitly include state owned enterprises (SOE)s, an omission that has been criticized by commentators for failing to reflect the reality of investment structures in non-market economies.
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More problematically ICSID's jurisdiction does not contemplate SOEs, suggesting that such entities might have difficulty bringing claims through ICSID against Western countries. Of course the fact that SOEs are not specifically mentioned in a treaty does not mean that these structures will not be protected, but it does suggest that SOEs will have to argue their entitlement to protections more forcibly than those who are free from government involvement. The bias against government-controlled MNE is further seen in the US' restrictions on the entrance of government owned insurance companies in its GATS commitments. India Oil, China's Sinopec, and Russia's Gazprom, which are also among the largest firms in the world as ranked by Fortune. 65 The lack of express coverage for SOEs undermines access of some of these countries' largest investors to the full protections enshrined in international investment law. In one sense this approach reflects the different political heritage of these countries where governments have traditionally played a much larger role in the economy than the free-enterprise-focused West, where much of modern international investment law was created. The on-going bias against SOEs could equally be viewed as an attempt to suppress non-Western firms from establishing market dominance in the West. Suspicions that SOEs are disguised agents of foreign policy attempting to secure control over strategic assets exacerbates this problem by playing to public discomfort with globalization as well as general xenophobia.
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In addition to the lack of provision for SOEs, some IIAs specifically exclude protections for investments in government services. 67 GATS notably excludes government services entirely from its ambit. This may reflect a national security concern for public-type services like defence, or it might indicate that certain sectors are so essential that they cannot be subjected to the risk associated with private, foreign providers, who may discontinue business if profits are not forthcoming. The omission of government services from the GATS also represents a significant lost opportunity for emerging market MNEs, particularly as many of these have Japan's regional governments do not list the production, transportation or distribution of electricity. 70 A number of US States provide no commitments to GPA coverage whatsoever.
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Developing states often require that for "investments" to be protected under their IIAs, performance requirements may be imposed upon incoming investors, which would otherwise represent a departure from the national treatment guarantee. This is a way for lesser developed countries to ensure that they gain an economic benefit from the presence of the foreign firm, possibly through mandatory use of domestic materials, mandatory employment of locals or mandatory exports.
Emerging markets such as China and India have been required to surrender some of the performance requirements they imposed on foreign investors as a condition of BOOT's as they are often described) could act as suitable models in this regard.
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BOOTs are a form of project finance in which a the investor, which may be a foreign firm, designs and constructs a project or facility, such as a road or airport, is granted ownership over it by the host government and operates it as a business for a specified period. After this title to the project is transferred to the government at a previously agreed upon or market price. sources, including private banks, however in many cases financing comes directly from the host government. Government involvement often insures that the investor will recover all their construction and operational costs. BOOTs and similar project finance structures were most popular for infrastructure projects in developing countries in the mid 1990s, but became much less so after the Asian financial crisis of the latter part of that decade. The BOOT structure requires close government involvement in the transaction, whereas a feature of economic governance of many countries in recent decades has been the de-coupling of government control over the economy in favour of a regulatory model. The usefulness of BOOTs has been therefore limited, at least in mature economies. Greater government participation in FDI, which appears to underpin many of the observed modifications of IIAs discussed above, could fit with this project finance structure.
BOOTs should also appeal to foreign investors. One of the reasons that BOOT arrangements have been so popular for infrastructure related projects in emerging Asian countries such as Thailand and Vietnam is because they mandate cooperation between the foreign investor and the host state partner, limiting some of the risk that the project will fail, while spreading profits if it is successful. There is also no need to extend national treatment to the pre-investment stage, as the terms of the project are set through negotiation with the local partner that provides the investment capital. 86 The government or local partner then recoups this cost by charging private purchasers for the use of the service, such as electricity or water services. While some BOOT arrangements have resulted in disputes, notably that related to the Dhabhol energy project in India, arbitration over the value of the investment is generally less likely because the transfer price has been pre-established. 
